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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Granting A New Trial Based On White’s Testimony That
She Put Contraband In The Cooler
A.

Introduction
The district court granted Washington a new trial because White, a defense

witness, modified her testimony from claiming at trial that she framed Washington for
possession of a controlled substance using a third party’s contraband to claiming posttrial that she framed Washington for possession of a controlled substance using, in part,
her own contraband. (R., p. 211; compare Trial Tr., p. 294, L. 7 – p. 308, L. 21 with
3/9/18 Tr., p. 6, L. 20 – p. 24, L. 1. See also Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) In doing so, the
district court erred by incorrectly applying the standard applicable to recanting state’s
witnesses rather than the general newly discovered evidence standard and by concluding
that the change in the defense witness’s testimony merited a new trial under any standard.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-14.)
On appeal Washington implicitly acknowledges that the district court applied an
incorrect legal standard (albeit for different reasons than argued by the state), but
contends the district court nevertheless reached the correct result. (Respondent’s brief,
pp. 8-20.) Specifically, he argues (contrary to the district court’s articulation of the
standard) that the standard for granting a new trial based on witness recantation applies
equally to defense witnesses as to state’s witnesses (Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-11), that
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial because the witness testified
falsely at trial (Respondent’s brief, pp. 12-18), and that application of the newly
discovered evidence standard still leads to a new trial (Respondent’s brief, pp. 18-20).
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None of these arguments has merit. First, the standard for granting a new trial based on
the recantation of a state’s witness is not applicable to defense witnesses. Second, the
district court did abuse its discretion when it misapplied the law. Third, the record shows
reversible error under the newly discovered evidence standard.

B.

Standard Of Review
A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72, 253 P.3d 727, 746 (2011); State v.
Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687, 889 P.2d 118, 121 (Ct. App. 1995). A court abuses its
discretion if it does not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion, does not act
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards
or does not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting A New Trial Because It
Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard And Did Not Reach Its Conclusion By An
Exercise Of Reason Supported By The Record
A court may grant a new trial “[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the

defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial.”

I.C. § 19-2406(7).

There are two tests for whether newly

discovered evidence merits a new trial. Under the general test, called the Drapeau test,
“[n]ewly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the defendant demonstrates: (1)
the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial;
(2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably
produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of
2

diligence on the part of the defendant.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d
217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)).
However, “where a defendant submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the
witness recants his testimony” the court applies the Scroggins test, which “considers (1)
whether the testimony given by a material witness was false; (2) whether without that
testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) whether the party
seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was
unable to meet it, or, did not know it was false until after the trial.” State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 72, 253 P.3d 727, 746 (2011) (emphasis original, quotations omitted).
1.

The District Court Erred By Applying The Scroggins Test To A Change In
Proposed Testimony By A Favorable Witness

As set forth above, the Scroggins test applies “‘where a defendant submits an
affidavit by a government witness in which the witness recants his testimony.’” Ellington,
151 Idaho at 72, 253 P.3d at 746 (emphasis original) (quoting State v. Scroggins, 110
Idaho 380, 385, 716 P.2d 1152, 1157 (1985)). (See also Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11
(setting forth cases holding that Scroggins applies to either government witnesses or codefendants who testify adversely to the defendant seeking a new trial).) The district court
acknowledged that a defendant claiming witness recantation must “submit[] an affidavit
by a government witness.” (3/9/18 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 22-23 (emphasis added).) It erred by
then applying a recanting witness standard, instead of the newly discovered evidence
standard, where the witness was a defense witness.
Washington implicitly recognizes the district court applied an incorrect legal
standard insofar as that standard applies only to government witnesses. He argues,
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however, that despite repeated statements that the test applies to recantation by a witness
adverse to the defendant, the Scroggins standard is “‘the standard for evaluating recanted
testimony in Idaho.’” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-12 (quoting Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73,
151 P.3d at 747 (quoting State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152, 730 P.2d 1069, 1072
(Ct. App. 2007))).) This argument does not withstand analysis.
First, the Scroggins test explicitly applies to “situation[s] where a government
witness specifically identified that he had perjured himself on the stand, and further
expressly recanted his testimony.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73, 253 P.3d at 747. See also
Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384, 716 P.2d at 1156 (test applies “where a party contends that a
government witness falsly [sic] testified at trial”). The requirement that the witness be
adverse to the defendant is often articulated as a specific component of the test itself.
State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 712, 864 P.2d 149, 158 (1993) (“a new trial should be
held based on recanted testimony if the defendant (1) submits an affidavit by a
government witness in which the witness recants his or her testimony, specifies in what
ways he or she dishonestly testified, and in what ways, if given the opportunity, he or she
would testify differently, and (2) makes a showing that such changed testimony may be
material to a finding of the defendant’s guilt or innocence” (emphasis added)). The test,
applied by the district court, is explicitly applicable only to recantations by witnesses
adverse to the defendant. Thus, although the district court acknowledged that the first
prong of the test is whether the recantation was by a government witness, he erred by
applying the test to a change in testimony by a defense witness.
Even in those cases where the test is not articulated as explicitly limited to
situations where the recanted testimony is adverse to the defendant, this limitation is
4

implicit. The expression of the Scroggins standard favored by Washington (Appellant’s
brief, p. 12) is: “(1) whether the testimony given by a material witness was false; (2)
whether without that testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and
(3) whether the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony
was given and was unable to meet it, or, did not know it was false until after the trial.”
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 72, 253 P.3d at 746 (emphasis added). In situations such as this
case, where a witness testified favorably to the defense but would change her testimony to
a version still favorable to the defense in a re-trial, a test of whether the jury would have
reached a different conclusion without the originally offered testimony is merely an effort
in futility. Unlike the Drapeau test, which looks at how the new testimony would affect
the re-trial, the Scroggins test evaluates how the recanted testimony affected the first trial.
Simply stated, the Scroggins test is either expressly limited to adverse testimony or
assumes the recanted testimony was adverse to the defendant.
In contending otherwise, Washington states that “motions based on recanted,
perjured testimony raise different concerns than motions based on other newly-discovered
evidence” because perjury “affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that
overlooked evidence does not” and that test-created incentives to find evidence do not
apply to addressing perjury. (Respondent’s brief, p. 9 (citations omitted).) While this is
undoubtedly true, it simply does not follow that perjury by a defense witness affects the
integrity of the judicial process in the same way that perjury by a state’s witness or a codefendant testifying adversely to the defendant does. Likewise, incentives to address
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perjury by an adverse witness is a completely different animal than the incentives to
address perjury by a favorable defense witness. 1
In the present case there is no possibility that Washington’s conviction rests on
false testimony. To the contrary, both versions of White’s testimony are exculpatory.
The jury necessarily rejected White’s exculpatory trial testimony and did not weigh her
allegedly false testimony in favor of guilt. White’s new testimony is newly discovered
evidence subject to Drapeau analysis, not a recantation of evidence used to convict as
contemplated by Scroggins.
2.

Even If The Scroggins Test Were Applicable, A New Trial Was An Abuse
Of Discretion Under That Standard

Washington argues that the proper test is:
“(1) that the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by
the material witness is false; (2) that without it, the jury might have
reached a different conclusion; [and] (3) that the party seeking the new
trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was
unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.”
(Respondent’s brief, p. 12 (brackets original) (quoting Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85,
716 P.2d at 1156-57 (internal quotations omitted)). However, if accepted, this argument
shows error by the district court because the district court did not apply this standard.

1

Washington cites Bean v. State, 119 Idaho 645, 646-48, 809 P.2d 506, 507-09 (Ct. App.
1990), aff’d 119 Idaho 632, 809 P.2d 493 (1991), for the proposition that a defense
witness’s perjury has “no less impact on the integrity of the judicial process than if a
government witness does so.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 9.) However, the witness in that
case was a co-defendant who recanted trial testimony “adverse” to the defendant. Bean,
119 Idaho at 646, 809 P.2d at 507. The court rejected the argument that Scroggins did
not apply in such a circumstance because the “state cannot allow a person to be, or to
remain, incarcerated on the basis of falsehoods” Id., 119 Idaho at 647 n.1, 809 P.2d at
508 n.1. For the reasons set forth in this brief, this reasoning does not apply where a
defense witness offers to provide testimony more favorable to the defendant than the
already favorable trial testimony necessarily rejected by the jury.
6

The test applied by the district court was:
where a Defendant submits an affidavit by a government witness in which
the witness recants testimony and, two, specifies what way the witness
would dishonestly testify and what the witness would testify given the
opportunity to testify again and where the Defendant makes a showing that
such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt or
innocence, a new trial should be had.
(3/9/18 Tr., p. 41, L. 22 – p. 42, L. 4.) Washington does not contend that this was the
proper legal standard, and in fact makes an argument directly contrary to this standard.
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 12-18.) The state claims that the district court was correct that
the standard applicable to a new trial claim of recanted testimony requires a showing that
the witness in question was a “government witness,” but erred when it applied that
standard to this case, which obviously does not involve recantation by a government
witness. Washington has effectively conceded error by the district court.
Interpreting Washington’s argument as a “right result wrong reason” argument,
review shows that even accepting Washington’s proposed legal standard the district court
reached a wrong conclusion.
This Court, after pointing out that the initiation of a new trial claim of witness
recantation starts with the presentation of an affidavit by a government witness, stated
that the court should consider: “(1) whether the testimony given by a material witness was
false; (2) whether without that testimony the jury might have reached a different
conclusion; and (3) whether the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when
the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it, or, did not know it was false
until after the trial.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 72, 253 P.3d at 746. Even skipping the first
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step of an affidavit by a government witness, Washington has failed to show that the
district court reached a right result under the three factors as articulated.
(1) Whether the testimony given by a material witness was false. The state
stipulates that White’s trial testimony was false, on the basis that pretty much everything
she has said in relation to this case has been false. It was the state’s position at trial that
White’s testimony was false, and the jury necessarily found it so. The fact that White
cannot tell the same story twice running is not grounds for granting Washington a new
trial. The Scroggins standard assumes that the question is whether the defendant might
have been convicted on the basis of false testimony. That White lied at trial creates no
risk of a conviction on false testimony because she provided exculpatory testimony when
called by the defense.
(2) Whether without that testimony the jury might have reached a different
conclusion. As noted above, the difference between the newly discovered evidence
(Drapeau) standard and the recanted trial testimony (Scroggins) test is that the materiality
issue presented by the former is what effect the new evidence would have on a re-trial
while the latter looks at what effect the now recanted testimony had on the guilty verdict
at the original trial. Because the jury convicted after hearing the “recanted” exculpatory
testimony, there is no reason to believe that they would not have convicted had the
testimony never been presented at trial. In short, there is no reason on this record to
believe the jury “might have reached a different conclusion” without the recanted
testimony.
After arguing that the second prong of the proper test is whether “without it [the
recanted testimony], the jury might have reached a different conclusion,” (Respondent’s
8

brief, p. 12), Washington makes no attempt to apply that prong of the test (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 13-16). He argues that the “new testimony” is material because it would affect
the outcome on re-trial (the Drapeau standard), but makes no claim that “without [the
recanted] testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion.”

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) Washington cannot show that the district court reached a
correct result by applying an incorrect legal theory when he does not apply the legal
theory he argues was correct.
White’s altered testimony that she placed the methamphetamine pipe in the cooler
instead of seeing it there and that she placed a baggie with residue in the cooler is not
material under Scroggins. Despite arguing that the standard is whether “‘the jury might
have reached a different conclusion’” without White’s recanted testimony (Respondent’s
brief, p. 12 (quoting Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85, 716 P.2d at 1156-57)), White makes
no attempt to apply this standard. Under no articulation of the new trial tests did the
district court apply a correct legal standard. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that
the jury might have reached a different conclusion without whatever part of White’s
testimony this Court might conclude was recanted.
(3)

Whether the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when

the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it, or, did not know it was false
until after the trial. As already set forth, the change in White’s testimony relates to
whether she tried to get Washington arrested for drugs belonging to a third party left in
the car, which White knew about, or whether she tried to get Washington arrested for
drugs that she owned and planted in the car. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial
White testified in cross-examination that she met with defense counsel prior to trial and
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discussed her potential testimony. (3/9/18 Tr., p. 15, L. 21 – p. 16, L. 3.) When asked if
she told defense counsel “the same story that you’re telling now,” White answered,
“Yes.” (3/9/18 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-6.) When asked if she told defense counsel whether she
“put all the items into the green cooler,” including the “black Ziploc bag,” she answered,
“Yes.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-16. 2) On its face, this testimony shows Washington was not
taken by surprise by the allegedly false testimony White offered in trial because she told
defense counsel the version she was telling in the new trial motion prior to trial. The
defense was not taken by surprise, was not unable to meet it, and knew of any
discrepancies in the two versions of White’s testimony.
Although Washington advocates for application of a three-part test that includes
this element of surprise, inability to meet the testimony, or ignorance of the falsity of the
trial testimony, he does not address it in his brief. (See generally Respondent’s brief, pp.
12-18.) Thus, he makes no cogent argument that the district court reached a correct result
despite applying an erroneous legal standard.
The district court acknowledged that the Scroggins test applies to recantations by
government witnesses, but applied the test in this case even though White was a defense
witness. By applying Scroggins where it is inapplicable, the district court erred. On

2

In redirect examination White gave potentially conflicting testimony.
Q. You did not tell us that you put the items in the cooler; do you recall that?
A. I don’t recall that.

(3/9/18 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 17-19.) It is unclear whether White was testifying that she did not
recall whether she told defense counsel that she put the items in the cooler or whether she
was denying the premise of the question, that she did not tell defense counsel that she put
the items in the cooler. The district court made no findings on the potentially conflicting
testimony.
10

appeal Washington argues that a different formulation of the Scroggins test applies, and
therefore the district court properly granted the new trial motion.

Washington’s

argument, however, does not match his test. By failing to articulate how the facts of this
case show two of the three factors in the test Washington claims is the proper test, he has
failed to show the district court reached the right result despite application of an
erroneous legal standard.
3.

The Record Does Not Support Granting A New Trial For Newly
Discovered Evidence

Application of the Drapeau standard on this record shows that the district court
should be reversed.

“Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the

defendant demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant.” State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho
685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)). Under this standard granting a new trial was error
because the evidence did not support any finding under prongs two and three.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)
Washington argues that prong two, the evidence is material and not merely
cumulative or impeaching, is met because the testimony goes to Washington’s intent and
corroborates another defense witness. (Respondent’s brief, p. 19. 3) First, corroboration,
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Washington alternatively argues that this Court should vacate and remand.
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 18-19.)
11

like impeachment, is not material. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 335, 971 P.2d 1151,
1159 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Cumulative evidence is additional or corroborative evidence that
goes to prove what has already been established by other evidence” (internal quotation
omitted).) Second, whether the contraband belonged to White or her friend, and whether
the contraband was left in the cooler in the car by the friend or placed in the cooler by
White, is not material. The jury in the first case heard White’s evidence that Washington
played no role in placing the contraband in the cooler or the cooler in the car. The precise
mechanism by which the cooler and the contraband ended up in the car is not material.
Moreover, for these same reasons the alteration of the testimony regarding exactly
how the contraband came to be in the car will not probably produce an acquittal.
Washington argues that learning that White committed perjury in the first trial will
probably produce an acquittal in the second trial, analogizing this case to Ellington, 151
Idaho 53, 75-76, 253 P.3d 727, 749-50. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 19-20.) This argument
is self-refuting; perjury by a state’s witness (as in Ellington) is more likely to lead to an
acquittal. Perjury by a defense witness, not so much. White’s new version of the facts,
along with evidence that she already lied under oath in this case, will not probably
produce an acquittal.
The evidence presented in this case does not support granting a new trial. The
newly discovered evidence, that White wishes to testify differently about how the
contraband ended up in the car than she testified at trial, is neither material nor will it
probably produce an acquittal. The district court erred and should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
granting a new trial.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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